Joseph Ralph Warren v. John Melville : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Joseph Ralph Warren v. John Melville : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Phil Ivie; David N. Mortensen; Ivie & Young; Attorneys for Appellee.
Gary Pendleton; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Joseph Ralph Warren v. John Melville, No. 960361 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/292
UTAH COURT OF APPEAL8 
UTAH mmf 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO, ^ Q ^ I M - rf 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH RALPH WARREN, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No.: 960361-CA 
JOHN MELVILLE, : Priority 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL ENTERED IN THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE PRESIDING 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV I « Jagg 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
R. Phil Ivie, #3657 Gary W. Pendleton, #2564 
David N. Mortensen, #6617 150 North 200 East 
IVIE & YOUNG Suite #202 
48 North University Avenue St. George, Utah 84770 
Provo, Utah 84601 Attorney for Appellant 
Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH RALPH WARREN, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No.: 960361-CA 
JOHN MELVILLE, : Priority 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL ENTERED IN THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE PRESIDING 
R. Phil Ivie, #3657 Gary W. Pendleton, #2564 
David N. Mortensen, #6617 150 North 200 East 
IVIE & YOUNG Suite #202 
48 North University Avenue St. George, Utah 84770 
Provo, Utah 84601 Attorney for Appellant 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE HAVE BEEN MET 9 
A. Plaintiff Has Admitted That Some Of The Purposes Have Been Achieved 10 
B. The Available Evidence Shows That The Utah Legislature Acted Reasonably And 
Deliberately In Passing Utah's No-Fault Legislation And That The Legislation Has 
Achieved Its Purpose 13 
II. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW MUST BE APPLIED 15 
III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309m PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER 
WHEN APPLIED TO ARTICLE I. SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 18 
IV. UTAH'S NO-FAULT STATUTE WITHSTANDS DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS. 
INCLUDING THE OPEN COURT PROVISION 28 
V. UTAH'S NO FAULT LAWS ARE REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE 35 
CONCLUSION 39 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases cited: 
Allstate Ins.. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) 25 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 
717 P.d. 670 (Utah 1985) 2,4,15,16,28,29,33 
Bushnell v. Sapp. 571 P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1977) 8 
Chapman v. Dillon. 414 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1982) 8 
Collier v.Heinze. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 27 
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 
775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) 15,16,29,30,33 
Cruz v. Middlekauf Lincoln-Mercury. Inc.. 
909 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1996) 13 
Debry and Hilton Travel v. Capitol Airways. 
583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978) 27 
Fann v. McGuffev. 534 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1976) 8 
Gentile v. Altermatt. 363 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1976) 8,22,30,32 
Horton v. Goldminers Daughter. 
786 P.d. 1087 (Utah 1989) 15 
Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) 38 
Lasky v. State Farm Ins.. 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974) 8,32 
Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.d. 572 (Utah 1983) 2,4,15,18,19,33 
i i i 
Louisville & National Railroad v. Milton. 
218 U.S. 36 (1910) 22 
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman. 
277 U.S. 32,41(1928) 21 
Magaun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank. 
170 U.S. 283 (1898) 22 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) 33 
Manzanares v. Bell. 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan. 1974) 8,22,32,33 
Masich v. United States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co., 
191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948) 6-8 
Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago. 228 U.S. 61, 
33 S. Ct. 441,57 L. Ed. 730 (1918) 40 
Montgomery v. Daniels. 378 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1975) 9,22 
Moore v.Austin. 251 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 1977) 8 
Opinion of the Justices. 304 A.2d 881 (N.H. 1973) 9 
Orion Ins. Co. v. Daggs. 172 U.S. 557 (1899) 22 
Pinnickv.Clearv. 271 N.E. 2d 592 (Mass. 1971) 8,22,32 
Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991) 39 
Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. Inc.. 
903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995) 1 
Rvbeckv.Rvbeck. 358 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super.), 
appeal dismissed. 375 A.2d 269 (N.J. 1976) 9 
iv 
Scheppick v. Albertson's. Inc.. 
297 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah S. Ct., August 13,1996) 6,17 
Shavers v. Attorney General of Michigan. 
237 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) 8 
Society of Separationist. Inc. v. Whitehead. 
870 P.d. 916 (Utah 1993) 1 
Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 
889 P.2d. 409 (Utah 1994) 1 
Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah v. Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc.. 
782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989) 29 
Teaslevv.Mathis. 255 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1979) 8 
Williams v. Kennedy. 240 S.E.2d 51 (Ga. 1977) 8,22 
Wrolstad v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 
786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 17 
Statues Cited: 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431:10C-306 (1987, as amended) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) 1,2,4,11,12,36-
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(3) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2) (j)(Supp. 1996) 1 
Secondary Sources: 
All Industry Research Counsel, Compensation for 
Automobile Injuries in the United Stated. (1989) 13 
v 
Brent J. Giauque, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah --
State Constitutional Issues. 1970 Utah L.Rev. 248 12 
Brian A. Smith, Alliance of American Insurers, 
Reexamining the Cost Benefit of No-fault, Charter 
Property and Casualty Underwriters Journal, March .22 
Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
American Medical Association (4th ed. 1993) . . . _. -. 21 
McCormick on Evidence, § 328, at 386 • « i i • ,t i"1 '"1^) B 
Nemiah, Psychological Aspects of the Injured, 
7 TRIAI, 61, 62 (April/May 197F 15 
Paul S. Kochanowski and Madelyn V. Young, 
Deterrent Aspects of No-fault Automobile Insurance: 
Some Imperial Findings. 52 Journal of Risk and Insurance 286 (1985) 1 i 
Paul Zador and Adrian Lund, Re-Analysis of the Effects 
of No-fault Auto Insurance on Fatal Crashes. 
53 Journal of Risk and Insurance 234 (1986) 14,36 
Report of the New York State Department of Insurance, 
Automobile Insurance... for Whose Benefit? (1970) . 36 
Robert E. Keeton, Compensation Systems and 
Utah's No-fault statute. 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383 . . . . . . .
 r -
 1
* 36 
Stephen J. Carroll and James S. Kakalic, No-fault Approaches 
to Compensating Auto Accident Victims. The Journal of Risk 
and Insurance, Vol. 60, Num. 2 (1993) . 14 
Stephen J. Carroll, Allan Abrahamse, Mary Vaiana, The Costs 
of Excess Medical Plans for Automobile Personal Injuries. RAND: 
The Institute for Civil Justice (1995^ 14 
vi 
U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Compensating an Auto 
Accident Victim: A Follow-Up Report on No-Fault Auto 
Insurance Experiences, (1985) 8,13,21,26 
United States Department of Transportation Report, Motor Vehicle 
Crash Losses and Compensation in the United States (1971) 35 
vn 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This matter has been poured over from the Utah Supreme Court, and therefore 
jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2) (j)(Supp. 
1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of the issue: Does the statutory tort threshold of the Utah no-fault automobile 
insurance law1 violate sections 7,11, and 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution. 
Standard of review: Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, the 
appellate courts review the district court's ruling for correctness and accord the trial court no 
particular deference. Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. Inc.. 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995). A statute is 
presumed constitutional and any reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 889 P.2d. 409 (Utah 1994) 
(312 week limitation on injury related benefits presumed constitutional); Society of 
Separationists. Inc. v. Whitehead. 870 P.d. 916, 920 (Utah 1993). When addressing the 
constitutionality of the statute under due process (Article I, sections 7 and 11) or equal protection 
(Article I, section 24), this court should apply "careful scrutiny" or "realistic rational basis" 
review. 
1
 "Utah's no-fault laws" collectively refers to the provisions of chapter 22, Title 31A and 
chapter 12a, Title 41 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
1 
More exactly, as this court reviews the challenged statute under section 7 and section 11 
of Article I of the Utah Constitution, this court should apply the test laid out by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.d. 670 (Utah 1985). In reviewing Utah's 
no-fault statute under Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the test as announced in Lee 
v. Gaufin. 867 P.d. 572 (Utah 1983) should be applied.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following are reproduced in the Addendum to Appellee's Brief: Utah 
Constitution Article I, sections 7,11, and 24 as well as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee has no disagreement with the Appellant's statement of the case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff has admitted that the majority of the purposes of the no-fault statute have 
been met. There is no question that Utah's no-fault insurance law provides first party 
compensation, enabling an injured party to obtain prompt recompense for his or her most serious 
financial needs, without bearing the expense and lengthy delay associated with litigation to 
establish fault. Plaintiff specifically does not contend that the subject legislation fails to address 
2It should be noted as a preliminary matter that Plaintiffs appeal claims a constitutional 
infirmity on the part of Utah's no-fault statute under state law only. Specifically, Plaintiff has 
only claimed the statutes are unconstitutional under Article I, sections 7,11, and 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. Accordingly, federal constitutional questions have not been raised. 
2 
any legitimate government concerns. In fact, the plaintiff has admitted that the direct benefits 
coverage under the no-fault statutes have resulted in a "laudable improvement" in the expedited 
payment of pecuniary losses. As the plaintiff notes, this benefit is especially important for those 
with limited resources who would otherwise be unable to meet their immediate needs. The 
plaintiff has also conceded that he has not demonstrated that the statute is so shot through with 
exceptions as to make it incapable of effectively stabilizing or even reducing the costs of 
automobile insurance. 
Instead, the plaintiff has isolated a single component in the much larger statutory scheme 
which makes up a total remedy which a tort victim in an automobile case may recover. The no-
fault statute has no effect on special damages. In exchange for the exclusion of general damage 
in minor injury cases, plaintiffs receive their no-fault benefit quickly, without the need to 
adjudicate liability. Moreover, the benefits are paid without regard to comparative negligence. If 
an insurer is slow to pay, a plaintiff receives interest greater than the law allows for special 
damages normally, as well as attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) passes constitutional muster when applied to Article I, 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution. The no-fault laws are constitutional because they are 
reasonable, have more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objectives and in fact 
actually and substantially further the legislative objectives, and finally are reasonably necessary 
to further a legitimate legislative goal. In order to effectuate a more efficient and equitable 
3 
method of handling the greater bulk of personal injury claims arising out of automobile 
accidents, it was necessary that persons so injured be classified. Utah's no-fault insurance law is 
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 
However, before this court must look at the factors announced by the court in Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1983), this court must first find that the statutory classification is 
discriminatory against a person's constitutional right to a remedy. Since the remedy in this 
matter has not been completely abrogated, but it has only been modified to provide a different 
remedy in cases of more minor injury, one cannot find that the classification discriminates 
against a constitutional right. The majority of the traditional common law remedy remains 
intact, and in many respects the remedy has actually been expanded, for example by the awarding 
of attorney fees and interest for failure to timely pay benefits. For these reasons, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-309(l) passes constitutional muster when applied to Article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Utah's no-fault laws withstand due process analysis, including the open courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court in Berrv v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) held that a statute passes constitutional muster under Article I, sections 7 and 11 if 
an injured person is provided an effective and reasonable alternative remedy by due course of 
law. If the benefit provided is substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated, the statute must be found constitutional. In this matter, the no-fault laws of the State 
4 
of Utah provide an effective and reasonable alternative remedy. First, the remedy is effective 
and reasonable since the remedy is almost identical to that which existed in common law. The 
constitutional interests of the plaintiff in this case, and all other plaintiffs under the no-fault laws, 
have really not been changed significantly. All out-of-pocket damages are paid, and under the 
no-fault system, those damages are paid faster and more equitably than under the traditional tort 
system. 
As only one small facet of a remedy has been replaced, the effect on the plaintiff is not 
substantial. It is true that the form of the substitute is different. However, as the Berry court 
itself noted, the form of the remedy may be different, and need not necessarily include a judicial 
remedy. The Utah no-fault statute passes constitutional muster not only because it substitutes an 
alternative remedy, but the abrogation of any single element of a common law remedy for minor 
claims is justified because of the social and economic objectives achieved by the enactment of 
the no-fault statute. 
Because Utah's no-fault law is constitutional, Plaintiffs Complaint was properly 
dismissed. The district court's judgment must therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah No-fault Insurance Act is not an attempt to dismantle the court system. It is not 
a grand design to bar the courthouse doors to a citizenry clamoring for justice. The Utah no-fault 
insurance law retains the best of our tort system, while addressing some of its problems. The 
5 
best of our tort system is retained for those whose injuries are not minor. For those with less 
significant damages, the tort system was a costly, time consuming, inefficient method of 
providing compensation. The legislature chose to make the system more efficient for those more 
minor claims. As the analysis hereafter highlights and exhibits, the Utah no-fault insurance laws 
have achieved their objectives in a reasonable fashion, and therefore the law is constitutional and 
the judgment of the district court must be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs attempt to divert this court from making parallels between the Utah No-Fault 
Insurance Act and the Workers' Compensation Act is unavailing. The Workers' Compensation 
Act is a no-fault law. The Utah Supreme Court recently stated: 
The act basically creates a no-fault type insurance protection scheme for work related 
injuries in lieu of traditional common law tort remedies. 
Scheppick v. Albertson's. Inc.. 297 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Supreme Court, August 13, 1996). 
The constitutionality of the Workers' Compensation Act has long been decided. Looking to 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the 
constitutionality of compensation acts is too well settled to be questioned. Masich v. United 
States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948). The court in Masich stated: 
The basis for holding such act constitutional is that the state under its police power has 
the right to require industry to make compensation for damages which the industry itself 
causes. 
Id. at 624. Likewise, the legislature has within its police power the right to require those who use 
motor vehicles upon the roads of the State of Utah and who are injured by the operation of motor 
6 
vehicles amenable to the no-fault laws. In discussing the Article I, section 11 constitutional 
challenge the Masich court stated: 
Here we have a claim that the act, if construed to involve no compensation for partially 
disabled employees, is unconstitutional because it does not go far enough in providing 
remedies to injured employees. Had the act provided some measure of compensation for 
partial disability, then the claim of unconstitutionality could not have been raised, as the 
employee would have had a redress for the wrong. 
Id. Likewise in this case, had the no-fault act affected the plaintiff in this action so that he could 
not recover his out-of-pocket expenses, plaintiff might have some grounds for argument in the 
present appeal. But because the plaintiff in this case, and plaintiffs similarly situated, have 
redress for the damages which they have incurred, the statute is constitutional. The Masich court 
noted: 
It has always been contended by employers that the act offended the due process clause 
because it abolished certain defenses such as contributory negligence [of the] fellow 
servant, and assumption of the risk, and by the employee because it abolished the 
common law right of action for negligence. The contention has been however overruled 
because no one has a vested right in any rule of law. A statutory right can be taken away 
and it may vest the individual with a right as sacred and important as one existing under 
common law principles. 
If the legislature were to abolish all compensation and all common law rights for 
negligence of an employer, no contention could reasonably be made that it was a proper 
exercise of the police power. The reverse would be true and pauperism and its 
concomitants of vice and crime would flourish. However, if the main purpose of the act 
is to assess the costs of injury and disease against the industry, the welfare of the 
employee is improved and the act is constitutional. The fact that under the act certain of 
the employees are denied their common law right, and at the same time only given 
compensation conditioned upon reaching a stage of total disability, does not offend 
against the constitution and certain individual rights and remedies can be made to yield to 
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the public good. The humanitarian principals of the occupational disease act do 
overcome in part, the inadequacy of relief of common law for a class of employees, and 
the act should not be discarded because some members of the class have rights, which 
may be adversely effected. 
Id. Those same principals adhere to the no-fault law. For a great number of individuals injured 
in minor automobile accidents, the damages are so minor that they did not provide the incentive 
to bring a claim to the legal system. Instead, the costs of those claims were imposed upon an 
injured party or an already burdened society. The Utah no-fault laws pay any claim, no matter 
how small. 
Numerous constitutional challenges have been brought against no-fault acts in their 
twenty years of existence. The great majority of courts have upheld the no-fault acts under both 
due process and equal protection analyses.3 See Bushnell v. Sapp. 571 P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1977); 
Gentile v. Altermatt. 363 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1976); Chapman v. Dillon. 414 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1982); 
Laskv v. State Farm Ins.. 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Teaslev v. Mathis. 255 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1979); 
Williams v. Kennedy. 240 S.E.2d 51 (Ga. 1977); Manzanares v. Bell. 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan. 
1974); Fannv. McGuffev. 534 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1976); Pinnick v. Clearv. 271 N.E. 2d 592 
(Mass. 1971); Moore v. Austin. 251 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 1977); Shavers v. Attorney General of 
3,
'Different courts have used different rationales to support their holdings of 
constitutionality. Most uphold the limitation on the right to sue in return for guaranteed payment 
of no-fault benefits because the guaranteed payment is 'a reasonable alternative to a tort 
action.'"U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Compensating an Auto Accident Victim: A Follow-Up 
Report on No-Fault Auto Insurance Experiences. 146 (1985). 
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Michigan. 237 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Opinion of the Justices, 304 A.2d 881 (N.H. 
1973); Rybeckv.Rvbeck. 358 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super.), appeal dismissed, 375 A.2d 269 (N.J. 
1976); Montgomery v. Daniels, 378 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1975); Singer v. Shephard. 346 A.2d 897 
(Pa. 1975); Wheeler v. Travelers Insurance Company. 22 F.3d 534 (3rd Cir. 1994) (upheld New 
Jersey no-fault threshold under the fourteenth amendment). 
This court too will find that upon closer examination the Utah no-fault statute passes 
constitutional muster both under state due process and the equal protection analysis. 
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE HAVE BEEN MET 
Utah's no-fault insurance law provides first party compensation, enabling an injured party 
to obtain prompt recompense for his or her most serious financial needs, without bearing the 
expense and lengthy delay associated with litigation to establish fault. In return for the 
disallowance of general damages, a tort victim is given immediate payment of medical expenses 
and economic loss. The Utah no-fault insurance laws have no effect whatsoever on this 
plaintiffs, or any other person's, ability to completely recover their pecuniary losses. The Utah 
no-fault insurance law is a legislative realization that minor injury cases involve little in the way 
of non-economic detriment, and that the injured party is better compensated by immediate 
payment of first party benefits. It is the aggregate of benefits that clearly falls within the ambit 
of a reasonable alternative, and therefore, as a threshold matter, this court should note that the 
9 
plaintiff has singled out one small facet, that is general damages in cases of minor injuries, from 
the complete remedy available to persons suffering personal injuries in automobile accidents. 
A. Plaintiff Has Admitted That Some Of The Purposes Have Been Achieved 
It is important to note what the plaintiff admitted below. "Plaintiff does not contend that 
the subject legislation fails to address any legitimate concerns." (R. 84). "The direct benefit 
coverage provisions of the no-fault statutes have resulted in a laudable improvement in [the 
expedited payment of certain pecuniary losses] especially for those with limited resources who 
would otherwise be unable to meet their immediate needs." (R. 85). Lastly, "Plaintiff concedes 
that he has not demonstrated, as did the court in Malan v. Lewis, that the statute is 'so shot 
through with exceptions as to be incapable of effectively stabilizing or even reducing the cost of 
liability insurance. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a method which would have a 
greater potential capacity for reducing the cost of insurance than [the no-fault insurance laws]." 
(R. 99). 
As stated, Plaintiff has isolated a single component in a vast array of items of 
compensation which make up the total remedy which a tort victim in an automobile accident case 
may potentially recover. To claim that Utah's no-fault laws rob a potential plaintiff of a recovery 
is to read the statute myopically. Such a narrow reading of the statute is most probably 
attributable to a misperception. Because the legislature has intervened and established a 
threshold, it is conceivable that the public, plaintiffs, and counsel often assume that a substantial 
10 
limit has been put on recovery. However, as this case makes clear, and as the statute is written, 
the statute effects only general damages in the cases of minor injury. 
Plaintiff below claimed that he has received no benefit in exchange for the loss of his 
common law claim for lost wages, based upon the misperception that because the plaintiff had 
recovered some of his lost wages under a workers' compensation policy, he could not receive 
any further benefits under no-fault. (R. 80). Apparently, Plaintiff had simply not applied for lost 
wages under his no-fault policy. Utah's no-fault system does not rob the plaintiff of the ability to 
sue the defendant for lost wages. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) only bars actions for general 
damages. Accordingly, any lost wages in excess of no-fault benefits may be recovered in an 
action for special damages. Additionally, any difference between the benefits which were paid to 
the plaintiff under Workers' Compensation and no-fault are likewise recoverable under no-fault. 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(3) provides: 
The benefits payable to an injured person under § 31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of an 
accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan. 
Thus, no-fault benefits are reduced, not replaced, by workers' compensation. Thus, if Plaintiff 
has received worker's compensation benefits, and the time to make an application for further no-
fault benefits is not expired, Plaintiff is currently at liberty to apply for the difference between 
workers' compensation and the no-fault benefits. The benefit the plaintiff receives is a direct 
result of Utah's no-fault statute in that the no-fault benefits will be paid immediately. The 
11 
plaintiff will not need to await a resolution of a liability suit. Most importantly, these benefits 
are available to all injured parties, regardless of fault. 
Apparently the plaintiff is now convinced that his arguments regarding lost wages were 
without merit, for they have been dropped from his brief on appeal. Instead, as will be hereafter 
discussed, the plaintiff has erected new straw men to topple in an effort to show the 
unconstitutionality of the no-fault laws. 
Among these arguments are extensive analysis taken from or attributable to an educated 
guess at the Utah Supreme Court's review of a hypothetical statute in a law review note.4 
Plaintiff even quotes the note as to fixed statutory recoveries which do not exist under Utah's no-
fault law. See Plaintiffs Brief at 25. Plaintiffs under the law are not limited to fixed statutory 
recoveries. Plaintiff even asserts that: 
A "remedy" which provides only partial reimbursement of one's pecuniary losses and no 
compensation for his general damages does not provide "substantive protection" 
comparable to that provided by the common law. 
Plaintiffs Brief at 29. Any claim of "partial reimbursement" of pecuniary losses once again 
ignores the actual statute. If the statutory no-fault amounts do not make plaintiffs pecuniary 
losses whole, 31A-22-309(l) in no way precludes plaintiff from bringing an action for those 
losses. 
4Brent J. Giauque, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah - State Constitutional Issues. 
1970 Utah L.Rev. 248. 
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B. The Available Evidence Shows That The Utah Legislature Acted Reasonably And 
Deliberately In Passing Utah's No-Fault Legislation And That The Legislation Has 
Achieved Its Purpose5 
Professor Keeton characterized Utah's no-fault law as follows: 
The medical threshold provisions of the Utah Statute are better designed than those of 
most other No-fault laws to operate evenhandedly in the face of variations and charges 
for similar medical services in different communities, or by different doctors or hospitals 
within the single community.6 
In 1985, a U.S. Department of Transportation study (hereinafter "DOT study") (R. 145-149) 
showed: approximately twice as many accident victims are compensated under No-fault than 
under traditional tort systems; practically all no-fault payments are made within one year of 
injury, over 95%, as opposed to only half of tort awards; and average benefits under no-fault are 
79% greater.7 Research has shown that no-fault systems reduce the transactions costs, legal fees 
5While the U.S. Department of Transportation studies of 1971 and 1985 are part of the 
record below, See R. 145-149, many of the studies proffered by both the plaintiff and the 
defendant are not part of the record. "It is legitimate for a court to consider legislative facts 
without being restricted in any way by the rules of evidence. Utah R. Evid. 201 advisory 
committee's note." Cruz v. Middlekauf Lineoln-Mercurv. Inc., 909 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1996) 
(concurring opinion of Chief Justice Zimmerman). "Judicial notice of [legislative facts] occurs 
when a judge is faced with the task of creating law, by deciding upon the constitutional validity 
of a statute,... and the policy is thought to hinge upon social, economic, political or scientific 
facts." McCormick on Evidence, § 328, at 386, Vol. II (4th ed. 1992). 
6Robert E. Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-fault statute. 1973 Utah L. 
Rev. 383, 391. 
7U.S. Department of Transportation, Compensating an Auto Accident Victims: A Follow-
Up Report on No-fault Auto Insurance Experiences. 3,4, 6,113-17 (1985). See also All Industry 
Research Counsel, Compensation for Automobile Injuries in the United Stated. (1989). 
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and claims processing costs significantly.8 No-fault plans substantially increase the proportion of 
claimants who are fully compensated for their economic losses.9 The Rand Institute has shown 
that where no-fault coverage exists, claimants are less likely to submit excess claims.10 And 
lastly, where claims have been made that no-fault subverts personal responsibility and 
accountability, two studies have found such an assertion to be completely untrue.11 
The DOT study showed specifically as to Utah that a 13% savings in insurance premiums 
had been realized. The study further showed that in Utah approximately twice as many no-fault 
claims were made than traditional claims, thus showing that the no-fault statute handles the 
greater bulk of automobile cases as the legislature intended.12 No-fault is more efficient because 
it engenders proper rehabilitation. 
No-fault auto insurance does more for rehabilitation of auto accident victims than 
traditional auto insurance. No-fault, unlike traditional insurance, makes available to 
8Stephen J. Carroll and James S. Kakalic, No-fault Approaches to Compensating Auto 
Accident Victims. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 60, Num. 2, 265-287 (1993). (No-
fault plans reduce transaction costs by approximately 39%). 
9Idat280. 
10Stephen J. Carroll, Allan Abrahamse, Mary Vaiana, The Costs of Excess Medical Plans 
for Automobile Personal Injuries, RAND: The Institute for Civil Justice (1995). 
uPaul S. Kochanowski and Madelyn V. Young, Deterrent Aspects of No-fault 
Automobile Insurance: Some Imperial Findings, 52 Journal of Risk and Insurance 286 (1985); 
Paul Zador and Adrian Lund, Re-Analysis of the Effects of No-fault Auto Insurance on Fatal 
Crashes. 53 Journal of Risk and Insurance 234 (1986). 
12DOTStudyat40. 
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victims a significant amount of money immediately after an accident. This timely and 
guaranteed availability of benefits may b e . . . the most important contribution of no-fault 
to rehabilitation, because rehabilitation may not be effective unless a treatment program 
is started almost immediately after the accident.13 
Of course, without no-fault, the inefficient traditional tort system burdens society with the 
unrehabilitated tort claimant. 
All of these factors highlight that no-fault laws serve a vital and important purpose in a 
modern society where the automobile has become such an intricate part of living. 
II. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW MUST BE APPLIED 
The standard of review to be applied to questions regarding constitutionally protected 
rights appears clear, but requires explanation nonetheless.14 Both in addressing the 
13DOT Study at 107. "Finally, it should be recognized that the delays so frequently 
encountered in settling personal injury litigation tend to keep the patient trapped for months, 
even years, in a limbo of indecision and idleness in which dependency needs are fostered. 
During this time it frequently becomes so pointless to try to work toward rehabilitation that, 
practically, the patient remains an invalid until legal elements emanating from his injury are 
resolved." Nemiah, Psychological Aspects of the Injured. 7 TRIAL 61, 62 (April/May 1971). 
14Plaintiff has drawn the court's attention to a number of statements, primarily found in 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court, that the burden is 
upon the proponent of legislation to show the validity and constitutionality of a statute where 
constitutionally protected rights are involved. See Plaintiffs Brief at 31. Chief Justice 
Zimmerman would have the normal presumption of constitutionality reversed. See Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.d. 572, 580 (1993); Horton v. Goldminers Daughter. 786 P.d. 1087,1096 (Utah 
1989); Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.d. 348, 363 (Utah 1989); Berrv v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.d. 670, 681-83 (Utah 1985). However, to date Justice Zimmerman's 
position has not been adopted by the remainder of the court. Thus, under the doctrine of stare 
decisis, this court is compelled to follow the long recognized presumption of constitutionality 
which applies to any statute enacted by the legislature of this state. 
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constitutionality of a statute under due process (Article I, sections 7,11) or equal protection 
(Article I, section 24), the court should apply a "careful scrutiny" or "realistic rational basis" 
review to the statute. The justices of the Utah Supreme Court have described this review in a 
number of ways. In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), Justice 
Zimmerman wrote: 
[W]e should give the legislation and its justifications careful scrutiny to assure that 
redress of legally cognizable injuries is not unreasonably impaired. 
Id. Justice Zimmerman went on to explain: 
I do not suggest that we should strike down any such legislation if a less restrictive 
alternative is conceivable as might be required under a "fundamental rights" equal 
protection analysis. Rather, I agree with the approach taken in Berry of weighing the 
particular infringement on the Article I, section 11 interest at issue against the 
justifications offered for the restriction (citation omitted). This balancing process may 
not be as apparently neat and precise as the rigid equal protection classification tests that 
have developed under the federal Constitution, but it is an approach better calculated to 
recognize the realities that the legislature must face in attempting to deal with perceived 
social and economic problems. 
Id. In both the case of due process and equal protection analysis, the Utah Supreme Court has 
not simply told the lower courts to apply a standard of realistic rational or careful scrutiny 
review; instead, the court has identified specific tests to be applied to the questions of 
constitutionality of statutes. These tests should not be confused with federal strict scrutiny. 
In recognizing the legislature's prerogative in relation to compensation for personal 
injuries, the law of workers' compensation must be reviewed, as a finding of unconstitutionality 
in the present matter would suggest a conclusion that the workers' compensation laws are 
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unconstitutional as well. This court cannot brush aside the parallels between the Utah No-fault 
Insurance Act and the Workers' Compensation Act as easily as the plaintiff would wish. The 
Workers' Compensation Act is, in reality, a no-fault law. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
characterized the Workers' Compensation Act as follows: 
The Act basically creates a no-fault type insurance protection scheme for work related 
injuries in lieu of traditional common law tort remedies. 
Scheppick v. Albertsons. Inc.. 297 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Supreme Court, August 13, 1996). 
The court went on to note: 
Although in some cases, the amount of compensation a worker can receive under the act 
is more limited than the worker might receive in common law damages, the 
compensation is available without regard to fault, is more flexible in providing for 
physical disabilities and loss of wages, medical benefits, and benefits for dependants and 
survivors, and is provided more speedily and generally with less expense. 
Id at 12. The same can be said for the Utah No-fault Insurance Act. As has been and will be 
pointed out many times in this brief, the Utah No-fault Insurance Act only effects general 
damages. Out-of-pocket expenses are in no way effected, as they are in some situations under 
the Workers' Compensation Act. The Utah No-fault Insurance Act provides for compensation 
without regard to fault and provides this compensation more speedily and generally with less 
expense. 
As this court held in Wrolstad v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990): 
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The legislature clearly has power to alter the form of or to limit [a plaintiffs] 
compensation for his disease. However, to satisfy the open courts provision, the 
legislature cannot effectively preclude all compensation without providing an equivalent 
alternative remedy. 
In this case, that is exactly what the legislature has done. The legislature has only slightly altered 
the form of the remedy, and also slightly limited the compensation for the injury. But at the 
same time, the legislature has provided additional benefits so that the remedy is substantially the 
same, although the form is different. 
III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309m PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER 
WHEN APPLIED TO ARTICLE I. SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
Utah Constitution Article I, section 24 provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute under Article I, section 24, the 
test for review applicable to this case is found in Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 582 (Utah 1983). 
"In sum and in elaboration of the above, we hold that a statutory classification that discriminates 
against a person's constitutional right to a remedy for personal injury under Article I, section 11, 
is constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further 
the legislative objective, and in fact, actually and substantially further the valid legislative 
purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." 
Thus, prior to applying the Lee test, this court must first conclude that the statute 
discriminates against a constitutionally protected right in its operation. As the plaintiff 
recognizes: 
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In the event the court should determine that the No-fault statute provided substitute 
remedy which is "substantially equal in value or other benefit" to the remedy which is 
abrogated thereby, the legislation will not be subject to further review on a "due process" 
level. Moreover, such a determination would apparently destroy any basis for applying 
"heightened scrutiny," under a state equal protection analysis because the persons within 
the class would enjoy substantive protection substantially equal to that enjoyed by those 
who do not fall within the statutory classification. The statutory classification established 
by the No-fault threshold would still be subject to review but only under a "rational 
basis" standard which it would almost certainly survive. 
Plaintiffs Brief at 24-25. The court in Lee recognized: 
All laws, either explicitly by their terms or implicitly by exclusion from the scope of the 
law, create legal classifications. Justice Wolfe stated in State v. Mason. 94 Utah 501, 
507, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (1938): 
Of course, every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The legislature 
cannot in one act legislate as to all persons or all subject matters. It is inclusive as 
to some class or group and as to some human relationships, transactions, or 
functions and exclusions as to the remainder. For that reason, to be 
unconstitutional the discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A 
classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or 
subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, 
provided the differentiation bears reasonable relation to the purposes to be 
accomplished by the act. 
Id. at 577 n. 6. Utah's no-fault law is reasonable in the way it separates the claims of persons 
injured in automobile accidents into two categories, serious and less serious injuries. Under 
Utah's no-fault law, persons similarly situated are treated similarly and persons in different 
circumstances are not treated as though they were the same. By including both a "verbal" as well 
as a monetary threshold, the Utah Legislature conscientiously divided claims between serious 
and less serious injuries. 
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To some extent, plaintiff has admitted the subject legislation is reasonable. In fact, 
Plaintiff himself characterized the legislation as "laudable." "Plaintiff does not contend that the 
subject legislation fails to address any legitimate concerns." (R. 84). "The direct benefit 
coverage provisions of the No-fault statutes have resulted in the laudable improvement in [the 
expedited payment of pecuniary losses] especially for those with limited resources who would 
otherwise be unable to meet their immediate needs." (R. 85). Thus, Plaintiff has admitted that 
the subject legislation has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective of 
expediting claims. In fact, the plaintiff has admitted that the legislation actually and substantially 
furthers this valid legislative purpose. 
Utah's no-fault statute separates claims of injured persons into two categories, serious 
and minor injuries. The legislature's determination of what constitutes serious injury was not 
arbitrarily made, as is evident by a careful reading of § 31 A-22-309(l) which provides: 
A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy which 
includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.00. 
In drawing the classifications of serious and minor injuries, it was necessary for the 
legislature to draw the lines somewhere. As Justice Holmes wrote: 
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[W]hen it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or 
logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless 
we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. 
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman. 277 U.S. 32, 41(1928). 
It is helpful to note the plethora of injuries which would justify a general damage claim 
forward under the No-fault statute. Basically, these encompass all serious injures. 
Dismemberment, permanent disfigurement such as scars, and any permanent disability or 
impairment brings one over the threshold. This impairment can be quite minimal. If a plaintiff 
who has been in an automobile accident experiences intermittent muscle guarding which is 
observed by a physician, or nonuniform loss of range of motion, or even nonverifiable radicular 
complaints, a physician may assign a 5% whole-person impairment rating. Sge Guide to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment American Medical Association (4th ed. 1993). 
Utah's no-fault threshold is not arbitrary nor unreasonable. The thresholds identify any 
long lasting injury. Monetary thresholds in 1982 varied in the Unites States from $200.00 in 
New Jersey to $5,000.00 in the District of Columbia.15 Presently, Hawaii's no-fault monetary 
threshold is $10,000.00.16 Of course, if a threshold is too low it accomplishes nothing. The 
DOT study concluded that the $500.00 threshold in Georgia was too low to significantly reduce 
bodily injury claims. It is also generally recognized that periodic increases in the dollar threshold 
15DOTstudyat23. 
16Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431:10C-306 (1987, as amended). 
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are required to retain the benefit of the threshold. Perhaps $3,000.00 is not the perfect number. 
But perfection is not required. In the final analysis, a $3,000.00 monetary threshold is not "very 
wide of any reasonable mark." 
Numerous states have addressed equal protection concerns and whether no-fault remedies 
are reasonable. In all of the following cases, the courts held that the no-fault laws did not violate 
equal protection principles: Pinnick v. Cleary. 271 N.E. 2d 592 (Mass. 1971); Gentile v. 
Altermatt. 363 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1976); Williams v. Kennedy. 240 S.E. 2d 51 (Ga. 1977); 
Manzanares v. BelL 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan. 1974); Montgomery v. Daniels. 340 N.E. 2d 444 (N.Y. 
1975). In each of these cases, the legislation at issue differentiated between serious and minor 
injuries. The court in Manzanares, supra, wrote as to equal protection and classifications: 
Equal protection principals do not restrain the normal exercise of governmental power, 
but only abuse in the exertion of such authority. The principal of equal protection is not 
offended against simply because the exercise of the power may result in some inequity. 
Louisville & National Railroad v. Milton. 218 U.S. 36 (1910). There is no precise 
application of the rule of reasonableness in classifying, and equality permits many 
practical inequalities. There need not be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and 
things. Magaun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank. 170 U.S. 283 (1898). The state enjoys 
a wide range of discretion in distinguishing, selecting, and classifying, and it is sufficient 
if a classification is practical and not palpably arbitrary. Orion Ins. Co. v. Daggs. 172 
U.S. 557(1899). 
As has already been stated, a cursory review of 31A-22-309(l) shows that the legislature's 
determination of what constitutes a serious injury was not arbitrarily made. 
The plaintiff has attempted to show through the findings of Brian A. Smith, research 
manager, Alliance of American Insurers, in an article Reexamining the Cost Benefit of No-fault. 
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Charter Property and Casualty Underwriters Journal, March 1989 at 28 that the No-fault statute 
has not been cost effective. It should be noted that the report which plaintiff cites indicates that 
in 1982 the difference between the pure premium cost of the package of no-fault insurance in 
Utah as compared to a standard automobile package produced a savings of 13%. This same 
report, using numbers collected in 1987 shows that, for example, in Minnesota where the 
threshold is $4,000.00 a pure premium savings of 19% was realized. Plaintiff accurately cites the 
fact that in 1987 it appeared that Utah's no-fault statute appeared to produce a difference in the 
pure premium on 3.4% more than the estimated pure premium costs of a comparable standard 
automobile liability policy. A finding of constitutional infirmity should hardly rest on these 
numbers. In fact, in reviewing the whole of Mr. Smith's research, the research exhibits that the 
statute substantially effectuated its purpose. 
First, Mr. Smith's calculations are merely estimates. Second, if the data shows anything, 
it is that by enactment of no-fault statutes, the legislative intention of possibly stabilizing 
insurance costs or effectuating savings has been effectuated. Mr. Smith's research shows that in 
the period during the no-fault act's enactment, from 1973 and 1987, Utah experienced an average 
savings of 10% in pure premium. Indeed, in 19S2 a 13% savings was actually realized in Utah, 
thus substantially effectuating one of the goals of the Utah Legislature. Additionally, it should 
be noted that a possible savings in premium was only one of three identified legislative 
objectives. The more concrete legislative objectives which the statute does effectuate are (1) the 
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creation of a more efficient and equitable method of handling the greater bulk of personal injury 
claims as well as (2) a legislative program to encourage compliance with the security provisions 
of the motor vehicle financial responsibility act. 
The effect on courts is great. Whereas even minor general damage claims can take years 
to litigate and days to try, under Utah's No-fault Insurance laws claims are handled quickly, 
efficiently, and equitably. The plaintiff has simply failed to show that the statute operates 
inequitably among persons injured in automobile accidents. The plaintiff has failed to show that 
the statute is unreasonable and it does not effect the purposes it set out to. The equitable effect 
of the no-fault insurance laws cannot be understated. As in the case of workmens' compensation, 
the Utah no-fault act provides for no reduction for comparative negligence. Prior to its 
enactment, any defendant could argue that the out-of-pocket expenses of a plaintiff must be 
reduced due to comparative negligence. However, under the no-fault act, comparative 
negligence is not applicable to the majority of claims for special damages. With the foregoing 
facts in mind, the classification of the legislature differentiating between serious and minor 
injuries is reasonable. Any injury which is of significance is specifically exempted from the 
operation of the no-fault statutes's bar on general damages. The legislature intended to create a 
system which would enable an injured person to obtain relief for "out-of-pocket" damages on an 
expedited basis. The no-fault statute is a reasonable way to effectuate this purpose. 
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The second factor this court must look at is whether the legislative objective was 
legitimate. The legislative intent of the Utah Automobile No-fault Insurance Act was identified 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Allstate Ins.. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). The statute 
itself, as originally enacted, announced its intention as follows: 
The intention of the legislature is hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain 
savings in the rising cost of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more 
efficient, equatable method of handling the greater bulk of personal injury claims that 
arise out of automobile accidents. These being those not involving great amounts of 
damages. 
Id. at 1203. The main opinion in I vie also recognized that by coupling the no-fault statute with 
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, "the obvious legislative intent was to encourage 
compliance with the security provisions of the act." Id at 1200. All three of theses legislative 
objectives are legitimate. This court can recognize the inherent need in a society such as ours to 
encourage compliance with the security requirements of the motor vehicle financial 
responsibility act. In fact, operating a motor vehicle without insurance is a crime. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-12a-302. By enactment of the no-fault statute, an additional incentive was 
established to prompt those not currently carrying insurance to go out and get it. 
The effect of automobile accidents on the people of Utah, and on the nation as a whole, 
cannot be overlooked. 
In 1982, 1,269,00 people suffered motor-vehicle-accident-related injuries for which they 
were taken to a medical facility. Of this number, 156,000 were seriously injured and 
43,945 died. One-third of all motor vehicle accident victims were 15 to 24 years of age, 
and more than an additional one-fifth were 25 to 34 years of age. A large number of 
25 
these youthful victims did not have a comprehensive health insurance plan or more than 
the minimum required amount of auto insurance. 
Personal injury auto insurance is the major single source, although not the only source, 
from which motor vehicle accident victims recover compensation for the losses they 
suffer as a result of motor vehicle accidents. Society gives recognition to its importance 
by the fact that every State requires or strongly encourages the purchase of auto insurance 
through compulsory or financial responsibility laws. 
DOT Study at 1. 
The general populace benefits from a more efficient and equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of personal injury claims. Utah's no-fault insurance law provides first party 
compensation enabling an injured party to obtain prompt recompense for the most serious 
financial needs without bearing the expense and lengthy delay associated with litigation to 
establish fault. Individual injured persons benefit from a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of personal injury claims. This fact was borne out by the DOT study.17 
The DOT study found that approximately twice as many accident victims are compensated under 
no-fault than under liability policies and that practically all no-fault payments are made within 
one year of injury as opposed to only half of regular tort awards. Even more compelling in 
support of the constitutionality of Utah's no-fault statute, is the finding by the Department of 
Transportation that the average benefits collected under no-fault are.79% greater than traditional 
tort recoveries. Id One only need look at the no-fault statute and compare it with normal 
17U.S. Department of Transportation, Compensating Auto Accident Victims: A Follow-
up Report on No-fault Auto Insurance Experiences, 3 ,4 ,6 , 113-187 (1985). 
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litigation to arrive at the conclusion that the no-fault statute on its face and in its operation is 
more efficient at handling the greater bulk of personal injury claims that do not involve great 
amounts of damage. 
An insurer under the no-fault statute has 30 days after proof of loss is received to pay the 
claim. If the insurer does not pay the claim within that time, the injured party is entitled to 
interest at the rate of 1 Vi %, and attorneys' fees which might be incurred in forcing the insurer to 
pay the benefits. Such attorneys' fees would not be available in a normal tort context at common 
law.18 
As a result, the no-fault statute has in fact expanded the rights available to injured 
persons. In contrast to this expedited system of compensation, if one were to file a complaint 
and submit a single set of interrogatories, those interrogatories would not have to be answered for 
45 days. See Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, in most courts of this 
state, a trial could not be had on the matter for some months, even years. In the meantime, the 
injured party would not have these bills paid and would be subject to collection efforts by 
medical providers. No reduction of comparative fault is made. Lost wages are promptly 
received so that the injured party may meet his obligations. Under the no-fault statute, where 
I8Utah law has long held that attorneys' fees are not recoverable where no statutory or 
contractual authority for those fees exist, such as tort actions. Debry and Hilton Travel v. Capitol 
Airwavs. 583 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1978); Collier v. Heinze. 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
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fault is irrelevant vis-a-vie the injured party, claims are liquidated quickly, efficiently, and thus 
more equitably. 
By offering the benefits which the no-fault statute provides, a reasonable relationship 
exists between the classification the legislature has drawn between the serious and less serious 
injuries in automobile accidents, and the legislative objectives. The legislation does in fact 
achieve its purposes. As a result, all of the elements of the Lee test are met. On its face and in 
its operation, the Utah no-fault law operates uniformly. Accordingly, the no-fault statue passes 
constitutional muster under Utah Constitution Article I, section 24. 
IV. UTAH'S NO-FAULT STATUTE WITHSTANDS DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS. 
INCLUDING THE OPEN COURT PROVISION 
As Plaintiff pointed out, Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution is an extension of 
the Due Process Clause, Article I, section 7. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985) remains the leading case in due process analysis where constitutionally protected rights are 
at issue. The holding in Berry is clear in providing for a two part analysis. 
We hold that section 11 of the declaration of rights and the poragative of the legislature 
are properly accommodated by applying a two part analysis. First, section 11 is satisfied 
if the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by 
due course of law" for vindication of his constitutional interest The benefit provided by 
the substitute must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive protection to ones person, 
property or reputation, although the form of the substitute may be different. 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy 
or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
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eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Id at 680. 
In applying the two part test to the present case, it is important to look at comments made 
in the Berry decision. For example, the court in Berry stated: 
We do not mean to say, however, that Section 11 requires only a judicial remedy for the 
protection of "person, property or reputation." The term "due course of law" may permit 
non-judicial type remedies in lieu of judicial remedies as long as other constitutional 
provisions are not violated and the remedy provided is reasonable and equitable. 
Id. at 675 n.l. Further, the law in this state, as it is elsewhere, is that "no one has a vested right 
in any rule of law under either open courts or the due process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution." IcL at 675. The Berry court noted that neither the due process nor the open courts 
provision constitutionalizes the common law or otherwise freezes it as at the time of statehood. 
In addressing the issue of reasonable alternative remedies, the Berry court itself cited the 
Workmen' Compensation Act, the Occupational Disease Act, and most notably the Utah No-
fault Automobile Insurance Act as examples of statutes which provided an insurance remedy in 
lieu of a common law remedy. Berry. 717 P.2d at 677. See also Condemarin v. University 
Hospital 775 P.2d 348, 359 (Utah 1989); Sun Vallev Water Beds of Utah v. Herm Hughes & 
Sons. Inc.. 782 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1989). 
Like Utah, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recognized that its open courts provision 
required a reasonable alternative, but not an exact equation of remedies. 
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Thus for each remedy or item of damage existing under the prior fault system, it is not 
required that that item be duplicated under the act but that the bulk of remedies under the 
act be of such significance that a court is justified in viewing this legislation on the whole 
as a substitute, the benefits from which are sufficient to tolerate the removal of the prior 
cause of action. 
It is this aggregate of benefits to the insured that clearly falls within the ambit of 
reasonable alternative. 
Gentile v. Altermatt. 363 A.2d 1,15 (Conn. 1976). Therefore, while limiting recovery for the 
non-exempted plaintiff, the act further assures to each insured that when he is placed in the role 
of tort feasor he is granted immunity from suit to the extent that his victim is in the non-
exempted category. 
The true character of Article I, section 11 was summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Berry as follows: 
In sum, Section 11 does not recede before every legislative enactment, but neither may be 
applied in a mechanical fashion to strike every statute with which there may be a conflict. 
To hold every statute of repose unconstitutional without regard to the legislative purpose 
could result in the legislative inability to cope with wide spread social or economic evils. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
In commenting on Article I, section 11, particularly the Berry decision, Justice 
Zimmerman in his concurring opinion in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 368 
(Utah 1989) wrote: 
I do not suggest that we should strike down any such legislation if a less restrictive 
alternative is conceivable, as might be required by "fundamental rights" equal protection 
analysis [federal equal protection]. Rather, I agree with the approach taken in Berry of 
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weighing the particular infringement on the Article I, section 11 interest at issue against 
the justifications offered for the restriction. Berry. 717 P.2d at 680, 683. This balancing 
process may not be as apparently neat and precise as the rigid equal protection 
classifications tests that have developed under the federal Constitution, but it is an 
approach better calculated to recognize the realities that a legislature must face in 
attempting to deal with perceived social and economic problems 
Condemarin involved a question concerning the statutes which imposed a limit on the amount a 
person could claim against an uninsured government entity. In the Condemarin case, it appeared 
that due to the cap, which by the decision was declared unconstitutional, the plaintiff would not 
even be able to recover actual out-of-pocket losses. Justice Zimmerman, commented further in 
regards to Article I, section 11 in the context of the Condemarin facts: 
Returning to the present case, there could be no question that the legislation at issue, 
which severely restricts the right of every citizen to recover even actual out-of-pocket 
losses, both from a narrow category of health care providers who are the actual 
malefactors and from their governmental employer, substantially infringes upon those 
interests specifically protected by Article I, section 11. See Berry. 717 P.2d at 676 and n. 
3. 
In my view, when the people are deprived of a right to actual out-of-pocket expenditures 
that have been or will be incurred because of the tortious conduct of another, the 
infringement upon the right to recover for harm to a person is far more severe and 
requires far more justification than when general damages for pain and suffering or 
punitive damages are restricted. 
Id. at 369. Justice Zimmerman's comments are most telling. The no-fault statute does not 
interfere in any way with a tort victim's collection of out-of-pocket expenditures. Thus, Utah's 
no-fault statute satisfies Article I, section 11 on the first part of the Berry two part analysis alone. 
As the plaintiff recognizes: 
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In the event the court should determine that the no-fault statute provides a substitute 
remedy which is "substantially equal in value or other benefit" to the remedy which is 
abrogated thereby, the legislation will not be subject to further review on a "due process" 
level. Moreover, such a determination would apparently destroy any basis for applying 
"heightened scrutiny," under a state equal protection analysis because the persons within 
the class would enjoy substantive protection substantially equal to that enjoyed by those 
who do not fall within the statutory classification. The statutory classification established 
by the No-fault threshold would still be subject to review but only under a "rational 
basis" standard which it would almost certainly survive.19 
Plaintiffs Brief at 24-25. Since the injured person is given an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy, the statute is constitutional. 
Again, many states have addressed whether no-fault statutes provide a reasonable 
alternative remedy. Gentile v. Altermatt 363 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1975); Laskv v. State Farm. 296 
So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Manzanares v. Bell. 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan . 1974); Pinnick v. Clearv. 271 
N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971). In every one of these cases, the court found that the no-fault statute 
was a reasonable alternative. Of course, the exact nature of the remedy may have been changed, 
but the aggregate of benefits clearly falls within the ambit of reasonable alternative. 
In construing the Kansas no-fault statute, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized: 
Moreover, the Kansas No-Fault Act assures all motor vehicle accident victims of prompt, 
efficient payment of certain economic losses. To the extent there is a limitation on a 
person's ability to recover non-pecuniary damages, the rights received are no less 
adequate. 
19As has previously been explained, the standard of review of strict scrutiny does not 
apply in the present matter. The plaintiff concedes that the No-fault threshold would survive a 
rational basis review. 
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Manzanares, 522 P.2d at 1301. 
It is important for this court to note that all the Utah cases cited by the plaintiff which 
hold statutes unconstitutional under the open court provision involve the total abolition of any 
remedy, with the exception of Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
See Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) (medical malpractice statute of repose totally 
abrogated remedy); Berry v. Beech Aircraft,, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (products liability statute 
of repose abrogated any remedy); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) (guest statute 
abrogated entire remedy). In the single exception, Condemarin, the governmental immunity cap 
of $100,000.00 regarding medical malpractice claims was found unconstitutional as applied to 
the facts of Condemarin because it limited even economic and pecuniary, or out-of-pocket, 
damages. As a result, although these cases are clearly controlling and offer a frame work in 
which this courts analysis should be founded, these cases do not provide precedent for finding 
the no-fault insurance laws unconstitutional. 
In this case, in contrast to those cases which have found previous laws in the State of 
Utah unconstitutional under the open courts provision, only one small facet of a remedy has been 
replaced. No out-of-pocket or economic damages are taken from the plaintiff in this case. It is 
true that the form of the substitute is different. However, the Berry court itself noted that the 
form of a remedy may be different in that the form does not necessarily need to include a judicial 
remedy. Berry, 717 P.2d at 675 n. 1. The Utah no-fault statute passes muster because not only 
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does it substitute an alternate remedy, but the abrogation of any single element of the common 
law remedy is justifiable because of the social and economic evils which are overcome by 
enactment of the no-fault statute. 
As heretofore pointed out, two of the main reasons the no-fault statute was enacted were 
to create a more efficient process through which the great majority of personal injury claims 
could be liquidated, and to provide an incentive for persons to obtain motor vehicle insurance to 
drive on the highways of the State of Utah. The social and economic evils in this case are the 
same. Clogged courts and uninsured drivers are costly to society, both economically and 
otherwise.20 By removing a great number of minor automobile accident claims from the courts 
and providing a non-judicial remedy, the courts are free to address other needs of society such as 
the spheres of criminal law, commercial law, domestic law, and serious injury cases. Likewise, 
this court can appreciate the need to compel and induce the citizens of the State of Utah to 
purchase insurance. The uninsured driver is surely a social and economic evil to be dealt with. 
The legislature's use of the no-fault statute as an incentive is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 
Because the Utah no-fault laws provide a substitute remedy which is substantial in value 
or other benefit to the common law remedy for personal injury in a minor automobile accident, 
the legislation is not subject to further review under Berry. Nonetheless, even if the court were 
20No-fault has led to a reduction in the number of lawsuits and, thus, to significant 
savings in court and other public legal costs. Each jury tort trial costs the taxpayer 
approximately $8,300. DOT study at 5. 
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to look at whether the abrogation is justified, the legislature has eliminated a clear social and 
economic evil by reducing the number of claims in the courts and providing the incentive to 
reduce the number of uninsured drivers on the roads. Accordingly, Utah's no-fault insurance 
laws withstand Plaintiffs due process challenge under Article I, sections 7 and 11. 
V. UTAH'S NO FAULT LAWS ARE REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE 
As previously explained, there exists a common misperception that the Utah's no-fault 
laws have robbed a plaintiff of a significant amount of damages previously recoverable at 
common law. However, a thorough reading of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309 provides that no 
special damages have been effected. Only general damages in minor injury claims have been 
eliminated, and it is questionable whether such damages would be significant in any event. 
Below the plaintiff claimed that the Utah no-fault system destroyed personal 
accountability in the operation of motor vehicles upon the State of Utah. Plaintiff makes this 
same argument on appeal. Plaintiff claims that the insurance benefits and coverage offered by 
Utah's no-fault statute have nothing to do with interpersonal relationship or individual rights and 
that vindication can no longer be part of the social equation. Plaintiff claims that because of a 
lack of personal accountability, the no-fault statute will not make persons responsible to live up 
to a standard of reasonable care. This assertion lacks merit.21 
21It is an acknowledged fact that the exposure to the risk of tort liability in a common law 
setting did not function as a significant factor in motivating drivers to operate their vehicles 
carefully or prudently. See United States Department of Transportation Report prepared at the 
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First, the no-fault statute does not do away with personal accountability. Under the no-
fault statute, one is still liable under normal fault analysis for property damage. Even the 
smallest automobile accident involves property damage. Likewise, when one is involved in an 
accident, one has no idea whether a potential plaintiff is going to come under the tort threshold or 
not. It is conceivable that a normal lawsuit will arise out of any collision. The operator of any 
motor vehicle must be concerned with coming into contact with an "eggshell" plaintiff. 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 has no effect whatsoever on punitive damages. 
Therefore, personal accountability for acts such as drunk driving remain wholly intact. 
Defendant will concede that Plaintiffs desire for retribution and revenge has been 
replaced and a pound of flesh is no longer available. However, Plaintiffs assertion that personal 
accountability is sacrificed by the no-fault act has no basis whatsoever in fact as empirical data 
proves. One study showed "no evidence in support of the claim that no-fault insurance laws 
restricting general liability have led to increased fatal crashes in the United States." Abstract, 
Paul Zador and Adrian Lund, Reanalvsis of the Effects of No-fault Auto Insurance on Fatal 
Crashes. 53 Journal of Risk in Insurance 234 (1986). A second study indicated: 
The results indicate that fears of a dramatic escalation of fatal accidents because of no-
fault insurance are unfounded. Even on a theoretical basis such fears have weak 
underpinnings. On an empirical basis, they appear to have no foundation whatsoever. 
Request of Congress, Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and Compensation in the United States 
(1971); Report of the New York State Department of Insurance, Automobile Insurance . . . for 
Whose Benefit? (1970); Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965). 
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Abstract, Paul S. Kochanowski and Madeline B. Young, Deterrent Aspects of No-fault 
Automobile Insurance: Some Imparical Findings, 52 Journal of Risk in Insurance 286 (1985). 
The concept of fault is retained in the No-fault Act, but a determination of who is at fault 
is determined by arbitration between the insurers. The benefit which the plaintiff in this case has 
already received is that the benefits were immediately forthcoming, not dependant on this 
determination of fault. 
Plaintiffs arguments as to the arbitrariness of the no-fault statute are likewise without 
merit. Plaintiff seems to want to ignore the "verbal thresholds" which allow persons to continue 
with their tort claims when their medical expenses are less than $3,000.00. Those "verbal 
thresholds" include dismemberment, disability, and permanent impairment. In fact, Plaintiffs 
assertion that "the difference between having a common law cause of action and having no cause 
of action at all may be a function of nothing more than the distance from the site of the accident 
to the hospital if the injured party is transported by ambulance" highlights that the threshold is 
really not that high.22 In short, the plaintiff cannot show in any way that the statute operates 
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unequally as applied to him. Instead, the plaintiff must search for 
hopeless hypothetical situations in order to support his position. 
For example, throughout Plaintiffs brief, Plaintiff cites either as support, or takes aim at 
the American Insurance Association's model "Personal and Property Protection Motor Vehicle 
22Plaintiff Brief at 42. 
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Insurance Act." The problem with the plaintiffs analysis in this case, is that Utah did not enact 
the AIA plan. For example, the AIA plan provides for no-fault property damage insurance. The 
AIA plan likewise provides for no verbal thresholds like the Utah statute. Plaintiff relies on a 
1970 law review note which is really an educated guess at the actions of the Utah Supreme Court 
in reviewing an act which the Utah Legislature did not promulgate.23 In retrospect, many of the 
assertions in the note are very wide of the mark. To finish the quote which the plaintiff cites in 
his brief at 16: 
On its face, [Article I, section 11] would appear to invalidate the AIA plan because the 
plan denies an injured party to a right of action for pain and suffering, for permanent 
impairment and disfigurement, for damage to motor vehicles, and for damage to 
other exempted personal property when such injuries are inflicted by a party who 
has proper personal and property protection insurance.... 
Plaintiffs Brief at 16 (emphasis added). As the quote shows, the author of the note assumed that 
the constitutional review would include a plan which denies an injured party a right of action for 
permanent impairment or disfigurement and property damage. In short, the law review note does 
not discuss the present statute. 
Lastly, the plaintiff attempts to show the act as incongruent with other rules of law, none 
of which are applicable to the present case. First, Plaintiff attempts to show that the no-fault law 
is somehow in conflict with Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). Plaintiff himself 
recognizes, and a cursory reading of the decision clearly shows, that the applicability of the no-
23See supra note 4. 
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fault act is not addressed at all. The Johnson court's discussion of punitive damages is of course 
in no way effected by the no-fault act. Since Johnson v. Rogers does not discuss in any way the 
no-fault act, there cannot be claimed any conflict between that decision and the present act. 
Likewise, Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991), in no way discusses the no-fault act. 
The issue simply was not before the court in Reeves, and therefore no conflict can be found. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Utah's no-fault insurance law is reasonable and has more than a speculative 
tendency to further the legislative objective of expediting minor automobile accident injury 
cases, reducing insurance premiums, and creating an incentive to purchase compulsory 
insurance. Likewise, Utah's No-fault insurance laws provide a reasonable alternative to the 
common law remedy which was available prior to its enactment. The Legislature's classification 
is not arbitrary nor unreasonable. The objectives of the legislature have been realized. As a 
result, the Utah no-fault insurance laws are constitutional under Article I, sections 7,11, and 24 
of the Utah Constitution. While the plaintiff may have identified one or two minor and irrelevant 
flaws in the no-fault system, plaintiff has wholly failed to carry his burden of proving the 
unconstitutionality of the Utah no-fault laws. As the court in Manzanares. supra, pointed out: 
[T]o be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. It may seem 
unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of 
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough 
accommodations... .What is best is not always discernable; the wisdom of any choice 
may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to . . . judicial 
review 
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Manzanares. 522 P.2d 1291,1310 (Kan. 1974) (quoting Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago. 228 
U.S. 61, 69, 70, 33 S. Ct. 441,443, 57 L. Ed. 730,734 (1918)). The Utah no-fault law is 
constitutional. Therefore, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /V>ttav of November, 1996. 
DAVir/N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE-& YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
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Utah Const Art. I, Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Section 11. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Section 24. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-22-309(l). 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy which 
includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.00. 
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